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PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the v/itnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 10 [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous. In civil cases
three-fourths of the jurors may find a
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived
unless demanded.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.

v.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) provides:
76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits
theft if he obtains or exercies unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953 as amended) provides:
41-1-112. Receiving or transferring stolen
vehicle a felony. Any person who, with intent to
procure or pass title to a vehicle which he knows or
has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully
taken, receives, or transfers possession of the same
from or to another, or who has in his possession any
vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has
been stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not an
officer of the law engaged at the time in the
performance of his duty as such officer, is guilty
of a felony.
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)(1953 as amended) provides in
pertinent part:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be
convicted of both the offense charged and the
included offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, soliciation,
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a
lesser included offense.

VI.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

is the decision of the Court of Appeals that the

warrantless search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle did not violate the
Fourth Amendment in conflict with New York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960
(1986)?
2.

Should this court review the issue as to whether the

warrantless search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle violated Article I, §14
of the Utah Constitution where the Court of Appeals did not decide
the issue?
3.

Is the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding the

conversation between a juror and prosecution witness in conflict
with State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1987)?
4.

Should this Court review the issue raised on appeal

by Mr. Larocco that he was denied his sixth and fourteenth amendment
rights to a fair trial and equal protection when two jurors saw him
shackled and in police custody where the Court of Appeals failed to
address such issue?
5.

is the decision of the Court of Appeals that

Possession of a Stolen Vehicle is not a lesser included offense of
that same vehicle in conflict with Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953
as amended) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution?
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The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Larocco,
No. 860172-CA (filed August 27, 1987) is attached, as Appendix A to
this petition. A copy of that Court's order denying Appellantfs
Petition for Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix B.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on August 27,
1987 (Appendix A).

The Court denied Mr. Larocco's Petition for

Rehearing on October 6, 1987 (Addendum B).

The Petition for

Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for Writ of
Certiorari had to be filed.
Court (1986).

Rule 45(c) of the Utah Rules of Supreme

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is therefore

timely filed with this Court pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. §78-2-2(5 )(1986) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of Proceedings Below.
Appellant, Phillip Larocco, appealed from a conviction
and judgment for one count of Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 and
§76-6-412 (1953 as amended) and one count of Possession of a Stolen
Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§41-1-112 (1953 as amended).

A jury found him guilty after a trial

which was held on December 9 and 10, 1985 (See opinion at 1,
Appendix A ) .

The Court sentenced Mr. Larocco to concurrent terms of

one to fifteen years and zero to five years at the Utah State
Prison.

Trial proceedings occurred in Third Judicial District

Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
DAvid B. Dee, Judge, presiding.
On direct appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction.

The majority held that:

(1) The search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle without a
warrant was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, and the denial of
his motion to suppress proper;
(2) The conversation between a juror and witness in
the case did not constitute juror misconduct so as
to deprive Mr. Larocco of his constitutional right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Utah
Constitution; and,
(3) no error occurred in convicting Mr. Laracco of
both Theft of a Motor Vehicle and Possession of
Stolen Property involving the same motor vehicle.
- 2 -

The Court of Appeals did not address a fourth issue
raised on appeal by Mr. Larocco that Mr. Larocco was denied his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and equal
protection of the law when jurors saw him shackled and in police
custody on at least two occasions during trial. Nor did the Court
address the issue raised by Mr. Larocco as to whether the search
violated his rights under the Utah Constitution.
Mr. Larocco petitioned for rehearing on all points; that
petition was denied without comment and without addressing the
fourth issue raised on appeal which the Court had previously
ignored.

Mr. Larocco seeks review of the decision of the Court of

Appeals on all issues.
B.

Pertinent Facts.

In June, 1981f a man took a 1973 Ford Mustang for a test
drive from State Auto Sales Car Lot and never returned it (R. 186).
The salesman assisting the man reported the theft and gave a
description of the thief to police (R. 202). Police did not arrest
anyone on the charge at that time.
Four years later, in May, 1985, the salesman saw a person
he believed to be the thief at a different car lot (R. 190). The
salesman obtained information regarding the man he believed to be
the thief and relayed it to the owner of State Auto Sales Car Lot
(R. 192). The owner went to the neighborhood where the man lived
and spotted a 1973 Ford Mustang in front of Mr. Larocco's home (R.
215).
Two or three days later, a Salt Lake County detective
went to Mr. Larocco's home and saw a 1973 Mustang parked in front of
- 3 -

it (R. 231). She took down the address and the car's license number
and description (R. 231-33).

Thereafter, she ran a plate check and

found a vehicle identification number ("VIN") (3F05H101968) . A VIN
check revealed that a Mr. Hailes of Salt Lake City had purchased the
car in 1973 and registered it through 1975; the next registration
entry for the VIN was to Mr. Larocco (R. 232-233).
About a week later, the detective, along with another
officer and an employee of the Department of Motor Vehicles,
returned to Mr. Larocco's home; the Mustang was still parked in the
same place out front (R. 234). The officers and employee looked
through the windshield and saw a VIN on the dash which was identical
to the one obtained by the detective when she ran a license check
(3F05H101968)(R. 235-236).

The employee of the Division of Motor

Vehicles inspected the VIN on the dash from the exterior of the
vehicle and it appeared to be affixed in the normal manner (R.
283).

This VIN did not match that of the Mustang taken from State

Auto Sales Car Lot four years earlier (R. 235-236).
After seeing the matching VIN on the dash, the officers
opened the door and entered the car without a warrant (See
Stipulation of Facts submitted in connection with Defendant's Motion
to Suppress on August 6, 1985, Appendix C; Opinion, Appendix A at
2).

They found a different VIN, 3F05H164088, on the safety standard

sticker located on the inside edge of the door (R. 235). That VIN
matched that of the Mustang stolen from State Auto Sales Car Lot
four years earlier (R. 235). After finding the second VIN, the
police approached Mr. Larocco's home and arrested him (See Appendix
A at 2; R.15).

- 4 -

Prior to trial, Mr. Larocco filed a timely motion to
suppress evidence obtained by police as a result of the warrantless
search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle; the trial court denied that motion
(R. 60).
During trial, one of the jurors had a fairly lengthy
conversation with witness Hailes, the man who had owned a 1973
Mustang with VIN matching that found on the dashboard of Mr.
Larocco's car (R. 164). Mr. Hailes flipped on a couple light
switches and commented that they worked; he then said he hoped the
trial did not last long because he was driving to Eureka, where the
juror lived.

(See Appendix A at 17.)

whether she had been a juror before.

Mr. Hailes asked the juror
(See Appendix A at 17.) A

portion of the conversation also dealt with questions asked of the
panel on voir dire (R. 166). Mr. Hailes told the juror he was
surprised that none of the potential jurors would give greater
weight to the testimony of a police officer since he would believe a
police officer over a lay witness (R. 166). Another juror standing
nearby apparently heard the conversation but was not questioned by
the Court (R. 167) .
Mr. Larocco requested that the jury be instructed that
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle is a lesser included offense of Theft
of Motor Vehicle; the trial court denied the request and instructed
the jury that they could convict on both changes despite defense
counsel's objection.

The jury convicted Mr. Larocco of both counts

(R. 325) .
After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court
learned that two jurors had seen activity indicating that Mr.

- 5 -

Larocco was in custody.

One juror saw Mr. Larocco, apparently

handcuffed, being escorted down the stairs by a man wearing a suit
(R. 328). Another saw Mr. Larocco being placed into a police car
(R. 328-329).
On January 10, 1986, Mr. Larocco made a timely motion to
arrest judgment

based on the juror's misconduct and the

observations of other jurors which led them to believe Mr. Larocco
was in custody (R. 104-5).

The trial court denied the motion (R.

345.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. LAROCCOfS CAR
DID NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS IN CONFLICT
WITH ESTABLISHED LAW.
In the Court of Appeals, Mr. Larocco argued that the
warrantless search conducted by officers when they opened the door
and entered his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Larocco

had standing to challenge the search in this case where he claimed
to be the bonafide owner of the vehicle.

See Appendix A at 2-5; See

also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); State v. Montayne, 414
P.2d 958 (Utah 1966); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th
Cir. 1965); United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977).
While conflicting decisions exist as to whether entry
into a vehicle to find a VIN constitutes a search, the better
reasoned approach is that such an entry is a search.
United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965).

See Simpson v.

Furthermore, in New

York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960 (1986), the United States Supreme Court
stated:
- 6 -

"We note that our holding today does not authorize
police officers to enter a vehicle to obtain a
dashboard mounted VIN when the VIN is visible from
outside the vehicle. If the VIN is in plain view of
someone outside the vehicle, there is no
justification for governmental intrusion into the
passenger compartment to see it.
Id. at 969. This suggests that the United States Supreme Court
would also consider the warrantless entry in this case, where the
VIN on the dash was visible, to be a search.
The officers lacked probable cause to search the
vehicle.

See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v.

United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969); State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203
(Utah 1984) establishing two prong standard for probable cause. In
the present case, officers had no facts or information to justify
the search.

They saw a VIN through the front window of the car

which appeared to be properly mounted (R. 283). The VIN did not
match that of the stolen vehicle (R. 235-236).

Officers should have

continued the investigation or tried to obtain consent before
searching the vehicle.

Entering the vehicle on a hunch was improper

in this case where no probable cause existed.

See Ybarra v.

Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
The only exception to the search warrant requirement
which could possibly apply in this case is the "automobile
exception".

See State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983) for list

of exceptions. The "automobile exception" was first articulated in
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

While the law

regarding such exception in the federal context is somewhat
confusing and contradictory (See Appendix A at 9, 23-26), the facts
of this case nevertheless do not fit within its framework.

- 7 -

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the
United States Supreme Court distinguished between searches of a
moving vehicle which has been stopped (as in Carroll) and a
stationary vehicle and required exigent circumstances for the
warrantless search of a stationary vehicle,

in Hudson v. Texas, 588

S.W. 2d 348 (Tex. 1979), the Texas Supreme Court required one of the
following exigencies for a valid warrantless search of an
automobile:

(1) the car was moving when stopped, or (2) if

stationary, then the car is movable, the owner knew police were
investigating and the car would have been moved if officers did not
immediately seize it.
The majority of the Court Appeals panel hearing this case
believed that the decision in New York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960
(1986) compelled the conclusion that the warrantless search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment (See Appendix B at 5 ) . However, as
Justice Billings pointed out in her concurrence, New York v. class,
supra, does not compel such a result.
In New York v. class, supra, Justice O'Connor
specifically limited her holding to the circumstances of that case.
In Class, officers attempted to ascertain a car's VIN after
observing Mr. Class commit two traffic violations and exit his
vehicle.

The VIN on the dashboard of the automobile was obscured by

papers; the officers reached inside the vehicle to move papers so as
to view the VIN and observed a gun.
The Class court pointed out that federal regulation
requires that the VIN for cars manufactured after 1969 must be

- 8 -

visible through the windshield.
C.F.R. §571.115.

See New York v. Class, supra; 49

In the present case, the automobile was

manufactured in 1973 and had a VIN visible on the dash as required
by federal regulation (Appendix A at 1, 21). It did not appear
abnormal to the employee of the Division of Motor Vehicles who
accompanied officers (R. 283). Mr. Larocco was not in the vehicle
nor was he stopped for traffic violations (Appendix A at 1).

After

seeing the VIN on the dash as required by federal regulation, the
officers chose to continue their search by opening the door of the
vehicle (Appendix A at 1 ) .
As the dissent noted, the Class court stated:
We note that our holding today does not authorize
police officers to enter a vehicle to obtain a
dashboard-mounted VIN when the VIN is visible from
outside the automobile. If the VIN is in the plain
view of someone outside the vehicle, there is no
justification for governmental intrusion into the
passenger compartment to see it.
New York v. Class, supra at 969 (emphasis added).
In this case, where the VIN on the dash was in plain
view, the officers had no reason to open the door for further
inspection, and the majority of the Court of Appeals misapplied New
York v. Class, supra, in deciding otherwise.
POINT II. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT
ADDRESS THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY MR. LAROCCO
THAT THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH VIOLATED ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Although Mr. Larocco argued that the search violated his
rights against unreasonable search and seizure under the Utah
Constitution, the Court of Appeals refused to address that issue.
In footnote 7 of its majority opinion, the Court of Appeals stated
in part:
- 9 -

The Utah Supreme Court has, to date, decided
search and seizure cases argued under a Utah
constitutional theory consonant with decisions under
the United States Constitution's fourth amendment,
eschewing a different standard. See State v. Hygh,
711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d
1334 (Utah 1984). We agree with the dissent that
any departure from this approach should be announced
by our state's supreme court, not this Court. We
further agree that it is in the context of vehicular
searches, which the federal courts have treated with
inconsistency, or worse, where consideration of some
departure from the course set by the federal courts
in interpreting the federal constitution would be
most appropriate.
Opinion, Appendix A at 9.
Judge Billings went further in her separate opinion,

To date the Utah Supreme Court, in applying
article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution to
warrantless vehicle searches, has followed the
interpretation previously given to the fourth
amendment by the United States Supreme Court. See
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). I
must, therefore, reluctantly concur in the decision
of the majority that the search was not
unconstitutional. However, I do not believe that
Utah must continue to accept the United States
Supreme Court's constantly changing interpretation
of the federal search and seizure law in
interpreting its own constitution. This change in
direction, however, must come from the supreme court
of this state.
Opinion, Appendix A at 23.
While the language in Article I, §14 of the Utah
Constitution is identical to that of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, this Court is nevertheless free to
interpret the Utah provision so as to allow greater protection i
the area of warrantless searches than its federal counterpart.
Judge Billings and the majority acknowledge, the federal law
concerning warrantless automobile searches is confusing and
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contradictory.

(See Appendix A at 9, 23-26).

See also Justice

Zimmerman's concurring opinion in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,
271-272 (Utah 1985) .
Justice Billings suggests that some of this confusion was
dissipated by the decision in California v. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 2066
(1985) but that "it

was done so at the sacrifice of the rights of

the citizens of this nation to be secure in their effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures."

(Appendix A at 26). While

confusion in this area still exists, especially when Carney is read
in light of the subsequent opinion in New York v. Class, supra, it
is nevertheless apparent that the federal protection against a
warrantless search of a vehicle has been severely eroded.

The

original purpose of warrantless automobile searches, the protection
of police officers and prevention of immediate destruction of
evidence, is no longer the basis for permitting such warrantless
searches.

See State v. Hygh, supra at 272 (Zimmerman, J.

concurring); see also Appendix A at 26. Despite the federal erosion
on the protection against unreasonable search and seizure, the State
of Utah may neverthess continue to offer this protection to its
citizens, AS Justice Billings concluded:
Following many of her sister state courts, the
Utah Supreme Court may take this opportunity to
simplify Utah's vehicle search and seizure law
without gutting the protection it provides to the
citizens of this state. See State v. Earl, 716 P.2d
803, 805 (Utah 1986). Warrantless vehicle searches
could be restricted to only those situations where
they serve their original purpose of protecting
police officers and preventing the immediate
destruction of evidence. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
264, 272 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
(Appendix A at 26).

- 11 -

In the present case where Mr. Larocco was not aware of
the investigation, the car remained parked in the same place for
several days, there was no evidence that officers were in danger or
evidence might be destroyed, the warrantless search of Mr. Larocco's
vehicle violated his rights against unreasonable search and seizure
under Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
POINT III,. THE UTAE[ COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED
THE ISSUE REGARDING THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
JUROR AND A PROSECUTION WITNESS IN A WAY THAT
IS IN CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S DECISION IN
STATE V. PIKE, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985).
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article
I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused a fair
trial by an impartial jury.

In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah

1985), this Court found that juror contact with a witness raises a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice.

That presumption attaches

regardless of the content of the conversation where the contact went
beyond the barest, incidental contact.
279.

State v. Pike, supra at

This Court stated in Pike:
Due consideration for the potential and often
unprovable tainting of a juror by contacts between
jurors and others involved in a trial that are more
than brief and inadvertent encounters, leads us to
reaffirm the proposition that a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice arises from any
unauthorized contact during a trial between
witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors
which goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and
brief contact. The possibility that improper
contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she may
not even be able to recognize and that a defendant
may be left with questions as to the impartiality of
the jury, leads to the conclusion that when the
contact is more than incidental, the burden is on
the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized
contact did not influence the juror.

Id. at 279.
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The present case presents a more egregious factual
situation than in Pike, The contact was more than merely incidental
or brief.

Prosecution witness Hailes owned a Mustang with a VIN

matching that found on the dashboard of Mr. Larocco's car (R. 164).
He flipped a couple light switches and commented they worked then
said he hoped the trial would not last long because he was driving
to Eureka where the juror lived.

(See Appendix A at 17.)

He asked

the juror whether she had been a juror before (Appendix A at 17)
then told her that he was surprised that none of the potential
jurors would give greater weight to the testimony of a police
officer since he would believe a police officer over a lay witness
(R. 166). Because of the length of the conversation and topics
covered, this conversation was more than merely incidental and
raised the presumption of prejudice.
The State failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.
The conversation regarding the trip to Eureka bred the same
familiarity with jurors as did the injured toe conversation in
Pike.

The conversation went beyond a general discussion and focused

on the credibility of the actual witnesses in the trial. Finally,
the court failed to question another juror who was standing nearby
and apparently overheard the conversation.
In two separate opinions, two of the three judges of the
Court of Appeals concluded that the state rebutted the presumption.
Justice Greenwood stated:
The state argues that the presumption was
successfully rebutted for three reasons: (1) the
juror stated she was not influenced by the contact;
(2) Mr. Hailes was not a key witness nor in such a
respected position that he would likely be
influential; and most importantly, (3) the testimony
- 13 -

presented at trial by police officers was
uncontroverted, so that their credibility was not an
issue.
She concluded:
The trial judge listened to the testimony and
arguments regarding possible prejudice. We find
that he reasonably determined that the state had
sustained its burden of demonstrating that no
prejudice against defendant resulted from the
contact.
Appendix A at 11.
Justice Orme believed that Pike required inquiry into
whether (1) the witness was important to the prosecution and (2) the
scope and subject matter of the conversation.

He concluded that

Hailes was an unimportant witness and therefore the increased
familiarity with the juror inconsequential.

He also concluded that

the subject matter of the conversation was not damaging since the
officers were not important witnesses either.

By this reasoning, no

witness alone, where the case is composed of many witnesses offering
bits of testimony to put the case together, even though each witness
is critical to establishing the state's case, would be important
enough to keep the presumption from being rebutted.

Hailes was

necessary to the state's case just as the police officers were, in
addition, familiarity with a prosecution witness could align a juror
with the state's position regardless of the importance of that
witness' testimony.

Finally, as Justice Billings points out, the

credibility of witnesses including officers is always at issue
regardless of whether the defendant puts on evidence or even
cross-examines them (Appendix A at 18-19).
In her dissent, Justice Billings offered a more correct
reading of Pike.

She pointed out that this court acknowledged in
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State v. Pike/ supra at 279-80, that it has "long taken a strict
approach in assuring that the constitutional guarantee of a fair
trial [is not] compromised by improper contacts between jurors and
witnesses . . . " and that "prejudice may well exist even though it
is not provable and even though a person who has been tainted may
not, himself, be able to recognize that fact." Appendix A at 16.
After a lengthy discussion of Pike and the facts in this case
(Appendix A at 16-19), she concluded:
I find that the encounter between Mr. Hailes and
the questioned juror created a presumption of
prejudice. Because the contact went to the
substance of the proceedings, and the record does
not persuade me the presumption of prejudice was
rebutted, I would reverse for a new trial by an
impartial jury.
Appendix A at 19.
Because the two justices who concurred in the majority
misread Pike and because the state failed to rebut the presumption
of prejudice, Mr. Larocco respectfully requests that this Court
review this issue.
POINT IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ADDRESS
THE ISSUE RAISED BY MR. LAROCCO THAT HE WAS DENIED
HIS SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO A FAIR
TRIAL AND EQUAL PROTECTION WHEN TWO JURORS SAW HIM
SHACKLED AND IN POLICE CUSTODY DURING TRIAL.
Trying a defendant in identifiable prison garb violates
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the law.
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).

See also Chess v. Smith,

617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) .
The California Supreme Court has held in a number of
decisions that shackles and similar devices are manifestly
- 15 -

prejudicial when viewed by the jury.

See People v. Harrington, 42

Cal. 165 (1871); People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322 (ca. 1977).
In the present case, during an adjournment, one juror saw
Mr. Larocco, apparently handcuffed, being escorted down the stairs
(R. 328). Another juror saw Mr. Larocco being placed in a police
car during a recess (R. 328-329).

Such viewings by jurors who would

ultimately decide the case violated Mr. Larocco's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and his Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection of the law.

Mr. Larocco raised

this issue on appeal to the Court of Appeals and the Court failed to
address it in its opinion.

Mr. Larocco raised the issue again in

his petition for rehearing which was denied without comment
(Appendix B).

Because the Court of Appeals failed to address this

issue even though Mr. Larocco raised it in his opening brief and in
his petition for rehearing, Mr. Larocco respectfully requests that
this Court review the issue.
POINT V. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE IS NOT A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF THAT SAME VEHICLE IS
IN CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW.
On appeal Mr. Larocco made two related assignments of
error, arguing (1) that he could not be convicted of theft of a
motor vehicle and possession of that same motor vehicle and
possession of that same motor vehicle and (2) the trial court erred
in refusing to instruct that possession of a stolen vehicle is a
lesser included offense of theft of that vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (3) (1953 as amended) provides
that an accused cannot be convicted of an underlying offense and an
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included offense and defines an included offense as one "established
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged."
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), this Court
held that under the circumstances of that case, the crime of theft
was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.

This court

explained that under §76-1-402 (3), "conviction of a lesser included
offense (1) is permitted as an alternate to the charged offense but
(2) is not permitted as an addition to it." Hill, 674 P.2d at 96.
See Shackleford v. State, 481 P.2d 163 (Okl. 1971)(holding defendant
could not be convicted of Robbery and Possession of Narcotics taken
in that robbery).
Courts examining the issue of double conviction have
almost unanimously followed the Shackelford court in holding that a
defendant cannot be convicted of both theft (or robbery or larceny)
and possession (or receiving or retaining) of the same stolen
property.

See e.g., Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619 (Alaska App.

1981); Pierce v. State, 627 P.2d 211 (Alaska App. 1981); People v.
Jackson, 627 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1981); State v. Alvarez, 678 P.2d 1132
(Kan. App. 1984); State v. Hernandez, 689 P.2d 1261 (Mont. 1984);
State v. Smith, 670 P.2d 963 (N.M. App. 1983); State v. Richards,
621 P.2d 165 (Wash. App. 1980); State v. McPherson, 444 P.2d 5 (Or.
1968) .
In the present case, Mr. Larocco was convicted of theft
of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, and of
possession of a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony.

Both

convictions related to the same vehicle, a 1973 Ford Mustang, which
was stolen on a single occasion in 1981.
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Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) lists the
elements of theft, the greater offense, while U.C.A. §41-1-112
outlines the elements of possession of a stolen vehicle. Both
elements of possession of a stolen vehicle:

1)

possessing a

vehicle, and 2) the possessor knowing or having reason to believe
that it was stolen, are necessarily included in the first element of
theft, which requires that an individual obtain or exercise control
over property of another.

Conviction of both violates the Fifth

Amendment prohibition of double jeopardy and/or the broader
prohibition of double convictions contained in U.C.A.
§76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended).
The Court of Appeals held that separate charges were
proper and no lesser included instruction necessary because "the
events occurred four years apart and where there were intervening
circumstances and perhaps intervening possessors of the stolen
goods, the argument fails" Appendix A at 12-13.

However, in this

case there was no evidence of intervening possessors or any activity
on the part of Mr. Larocco which would justify two separate
convictions for the single criminal activity of theft of the Mustang.
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals is in
conflict with existing law, Mr. Larocco respectfully requests that
this Court review this issue.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Larocco respectfully
requests that this Petition for Writ of Certiorari be granted and
that this Court review each of the five issues addressed.
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Defendant seeks reversal of his jury conviction of theft
and possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant contends the
trial court erred in: (1) admitting evidence obtained without a
search warrant; (2) refusing to grant a mistrial after a
conversation between a juror and a prosecution witness; and (3)
instructing the jury it could convict defendant of both theft
and possession of the same stolen vehicle.
In June of 1981, a distinctive 1973 Ford Mustang was
reported stolen from State Auto Sales. The theft allegedly
occurred when a man who had twice previously visited the car
lot was allowed by a salesman to take the car for an
unaccompanied test drive. The man failed to return the car or
pay for it.
In May of 1985, the same salesman saw defendant at another
car sales showroom. He obtained defendant's name and address
and relayed that information to the owner of the lot from which
the Mustang had been stolen in 1981, a Mr. Padilla. Mr.
Padilla could not locate the exact street address, but did
observe the Mustang parked on the street within a couple of
blocks of the address. Mr. Padilla noted the license number
and called the police.
Shortly thereafter Deputy Robison, in response to Mr.
Padilla's call, observed the Mustang parked in front of what
proved to be defendant's home and ascertained through state
licensing records that the Mustang.was registered in
defendant's name. Deputy Robison also checked the Vehicle
Identification Number (VIN) listed with the state for the

vehicle's registration and was informed that the VIN came from
a 1973 Mustang registered to a Mr. Neil Hailes.
About a week later Deputy Robison and two other officers
returned to the neighborhood where the Mustang was parked.
They looked through the front window at the VIN tag on the
dashboard. That VIN matched the VIN identified as being that
of Mr. Hailesf Mustang but did not match the VIN of the vehicle
stolen from Mr. Padilla's car lot. The officers then opened
the unlocked door and observed the VIN on the safety standard
sticker on the inside edge of the door. This VIN differed from
that on the dashboard, but matched that of the Mustang stolen
in 1981 from State Auto Sales. The officers then went to
defendants home, read him his Miranda rights, and arrested
him. Defendant consistently claimed he had purchased the
Mustang. Subsequent investigation revealed that Neil Hailes1
Mustang was totally destroyed in a car accident in December of
1975.
L
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Prior to trial and at trial defendant moved to suppress the
VIN evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of
the Mustang. The motions were denied. Defendant asserts on
appeal that the warrantless search violated his United States
and Utah constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure.1
Two elements must be examined in connection with the search
and seizure claim of defendant. First, we must determine if
defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the
search. Second, if we determine that defendant does have such
standing, we must ascertain whether or not the search was legal.
A.
STANDING
The question of standing to protest an alleged unlawful
search was discussed by the United States Supreme Court in
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Petitioners in Rakas
were passengers in, not owners of, a car which was searched by
1. Language in article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution is
substantially identical to that in the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitutions "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place-to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.n Utah Const, art. I, § 14.
860172-CA
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police without first obtaining a warrant. The search produced
a rifle and shells used as evidence to convict petitioners. In
arguing that the evidence should have been suppressed,
petitioners urged the Court to adopt the rule that a person has
standing to prevent a warrantless search when the search is
"directed- against that person or the person is legitimately on
the premises at the time of the search. The Court did not
agree, finding that fourth amendment rights are personal and do
not extend to the search of another's premises or property.
Id. at 133. The Court refused to expand the exclusionary rule
to vicarious use and stated the standard as being -whether the
person who claims protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.- l£l. at 144. The
-legitimate expectation of privacy- test continues to be the
usual measure utilized in federal and state search and seizure
proceedings.
Federal circuit courts have also examined standing to
object to search and seizure in fact situations somewhat
similar to the case herein. In Simpson v. United States, 346
F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965), the police, suspecting defendant had
stolen a vehicle, arrested him for vagrancy and investigation
of car theft and jailed him. While defendant was in jail, the
police conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle, which
produced evidence of violation of the Dyer Act. Based on that
evidence, defendant was convicted under the Dyer Act of
interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle. In reversing
the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the
evidence, the court rejected the notion that defendant could
not protest the search because the car was stolen, as such
reasoning would mean that police could conduct searches at
will. The result would be that
of all defendants prosecuted for
automobile theft, only those who actually
owned the automobiles could raise Fourth
Amendment objections successfully.
Moreover, the proof of ownership would be
sufficient to quash the prosecution for
theft of the automobile. These
constitutional rights belong to the guilty
as well as the innocent. (citation
omitted) The sole prerequisite to a
defendant's raising the Fourth Amendment
issue is that he claims a proprietary or
possessory interest in the searched or
seized property.
Ifi. at 294.
The Ninth Circuit also discussed standing of one accused of
auto theft to object to search of the alleged stolen vehicle.
The court stated that -a person accused of a Dyer Act violation
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as the defendant was here has automatic standing to contest the
validity of search or seizure of a vehicle or its contents
where possession of the vehicle forms the basis of the
charge.- United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263,,1269 (9th
Cir. 1977).
The Tenth Circuit later reached a different result in
United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788 (10th Cir,, 1984). In
Erickson, evidence obtained from a warrantless search of an
airplane was deemed admissible. The court stated that "no
testimony showed that the defendant had anything to do with
Emery Air Freight or that he was authorized by Emery to
possess, use, or fly the aircraft. Thus, defendant failed to
show lawful possession of the plane giving rise to a legitimate
expectation of privacy." Id., at 790. Erickson was
subsequently cited in United States v. Obreoon, 748 F.2d 1371,
1375 (10th Cir. 1984), where defendant was in sole possession
and control of a car rented by another. The court found
defendant had no standing to object to a search of a car which
was rented by someone else*
The Utah Supreme Court has also examined standing to object
to a warrantless search and seizure. In State v. Montavne, 18
Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958 (1966), defendant rented a car under a
false name and failed to return it when due. Defendant was
stopped by a police officer who knew he was a parolee. After
determining that the car was rented under a name other than
that of defendant and that it was overdue for return, the
police officer arrested defendant for car theft. He then
searched the car and found evidence which defendant sought to
have suppressed. The Court held that because defendant's lack
of ownership of the car was established prior to the search,
defendant had no standing to object to the search. The fourth
amendment can be invoked only by one who can establish that he
was a victim of an invasion of privacy. Id. at 960. Similarly
in State v. Purcell, 586 P«2d 441 (Utah 1978), the searched
vehicle was known to have been stolen prior to its search. The
Court stated that H[d]efendant simply lacks standing in court
to attack the warrant as to the search of the stolen
automobile, since on the facts before us, defendant had
absolutely no possessory or proprietary interest therein that
could have been invaded.H 1^. at 443.
In State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984), use of
evidence obtained from a vehicle which the defendant was
driving was challenged under both the Utah and United States
Constitutions. The search was upheld because defendant stated
he did not own the car and demonstrated no expectation of
privacy in the effects searched. Most recently, in State v.
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987), police officers saw
defendant and another person in a car. Police knew that
defendant had a suspended driverfs license and that the other
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occupant was wanted on an arrest warrant. They arrested both
occupants and impounded the car, which belonged to a third
person. An inventory search revealed marijuana. The Court held
that the evidence was admissible as defendant had no right to
possession of the car, it was registered to another and there was
no indication that defendant had been given permission to drive
the vehicle. The Court stated: "Absent claimed right to
possession, he could not assert any expectation of privacy in the
items seized and had no standing to object to the search.- Id.
at 127.
These Utah cases have been decided under both the United
States and the Utah Constitutions' search and seizure
provisions. In each Utah case where the search was upheld it was
clearly established and not disputed prior to the search that
defendant did not own or did not have an interest in the property
searched. These cases are distinguishable from those where
defendant asserts ownership of the property, or otherwise an
interest giving rise to a "legitimate expectation of privacy."
We agree with the reasoning in State v. Constantino, that there
must be at least a claimed right to possession in the property.
In addition, consistent with the reasoning of United States v.
Simpson, we believe that the fourth amendment and its Utah
counterpart would be rendered farcical if police officials were
allowed to engage in warrantless searches of property for the
ultimate purpose of proving that property stolen.
In this case, prior to the search, police knew that the car
was registered in defendant's name and that it was parked in
front of defendant's home. Only the search itself corroborated
other information indicating that it was the stolen vehicle.
Under these circumstances where defendant has not declared
beforehand that he has no interest in the vehicle, and where
proving that the car was stolen is one of the critical facts to
be established at trial, we hold that the defendant has standing
to challenge the legality of the search.
B.
LEGALITY OF SEARCH
We now turn to the question of whether the search, as
actually conducted, violated defendant's constitutional rights.
The parties stipulated that two officers first looked through the
windshield of the vehicle and noted a VIN which did not match
that of the stolen car. They then opened the unlocked driver's
door and noted a VIN on the safety sticker which did match that
of the stolen car. No further search of the car's interior was
conducted.
The legality of the search of a VIN has been addressed in
several cases. In Glisson v. United States, 406 F.2d 423 (5th
Cir. 1969), defendant was in jail on another matter when police
officers first searched a truck suspected to have been stolen
860172-CA
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by defendant. The officers opened the front door of the truck
and noted the VIN on the inside of the door. They tried to
locate an identification number in other locations on the
truck, but were unable to do so. The court observed that
* [manufacturers place confidential numbers in several hidden
locations and they correspond with the more obvious,
identification number placed just inside the door on the
drivers side of the vehicle." Glisson, 406 F.2d at 424. After
discussing the issue of whether or not the defendant had
standing to move for exclusion of evidence obtained in this
initial search of the vehicle, the court found the search
illegal for the following reasons: (1) the vehicle was in a
truck park while the defendant was in jail; (2) opening the
door of the truck was not incidental to an arrest; (3) no
emergency existed; (4) there was no danger that evidence would
be removed or destroyed; and (5) the identification number was
not needed for police bookkeeping records. Ifl. at 428.
United State v. Polk, 433 Fe2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970) also
involved testimony from a police officer as to a VIN on a
stolen vehicle. In Polk, the evidence was ruled admissible
because: (1) the car door was not locked; (2) no damage
occurred as a result of the police inspection; (3) there was no
search of private areas of the vehicle, such as the glove
compartment; (4) there was no seizure of the vehicle; (5) there
was no infringement of other property rights as the car was in
a repair garage; (6) the owner of the garage consented to the
inspection; and (7) there was no infringement of free movement
as the car was not stopped in transit. I<i. at 646-47. The
court discussed the purposes of VINs, including aiding law
enforcement personnel in tracing vehicles. The court then
found that
[t]here can therefore be no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the
identity of the VIN* Opening the car
door, looking under the hood, or crawling
under the car to inspect the rear axle
does not independently bring an inspection
of the VIN within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
Polk, 433 F.2d at 644. The court further observed that a car
is not like a home. Much of the interior and all of the
exterior is in view of the public and not protected. -Although
opening the [unlocked] door of the car may involve a technical
trespass, such action does not invade any expectation of
privacy.- I&. at 647-48.

860172-CA

6

The United States Supreme Court considered the legality of
a warrantless search for a VIN in Hew York v. Class. 106 S. Ct.
960 (1986).2 Police stopped a speeding car with a cracked
windshield. The officer opened the car door to look for the
VIN on the doorjamb, as he could not see the dashboard VIN
through the cracked windshield. When the officer did not find
the VIN on the doorjamb/ he moved papers aside on the dashboard
which obscured the VIN. In this process he observed a gun in
the car protruding from underneath the driver's seat. The
state used the gun as evidence in convicting defendant of
illegal possession of a weapon. Appeal was based on denial of
defendant's motion to suppress. The Court discussed at length
the purposes served by VINs and the federal statute requiring
that all automobiles have a VIN in plain view of someone
outside the car. 49 C.F.R. § 571.115 (1984). Justice
O'Connor/ speaking for the majority/ observed that "the State's
intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or
elsewhere/ cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless
the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy.'" Jji. at 965 (quoting Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347/ 360 (1967)). The Court found a
lesser legitimate expectation of privacy in automobiles than
other locations because of the physical characteristics of
automobiles. Their function is transportation/ not as a
repository of personal effects. Consequently/ the Court found
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN on the
dashboard. Ici. at 965-66. Covering the VIN with papers could
not change the result/ as an attempt to hide what was not
subject to privacy would not render it private.3 The Court
did say# however/ that the remainder of the car's interior was
subject to fourth amendment protection/ and an intrusion
therein would be a "search." I£. at 966. The Court held that
the search for the VIN is not a "search" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment because of the lack of reasonable
expectation of privacy, but then explained that the subsequent
seizure of the gun# which was in plain view, was justified by
the safety factor. Id. at 967-68.
The Court noted that VINs are, by law, either inside the
door or on the dashboard. "Neither of those locations is
2. The Court's main opinion was joined by a narrow majority.
J. O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court joined by C.J.
Burger, J. Blackmun, J. Powell and J. Rehnquist. J. Powell
concurred/ joined by C.J. Burger. J. Brennan filed a dissent
joined by J. Marshall and J. Stevens, and J. White dissented
joined by J. Stevens.
3. We note that the legitimate governmental purposes served by
readily visible VINs would be defeated if persons were able to
insulate them from inspection by obscuring them.
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subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. The officer
here checked both those locations, and only those two locations
. . . . He [the officer] did not even intrude into the
interior at all until after he had checked the door jamb for
the VIN*- Id. at 968. The Court clearly stated that VlNs,
whether on the dashboard or the car door, may be inspected by
police without a warrant, so long as the intrusion is for that
limited purpose, because there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy in a VIN.4 I£. at 968-69.
In the case before us, the officers could have easily
obtained a warrant for the search of the car. There was no
indication that the car would not be available, as defendant
had no idea that officers had been checking the car or
investigating the possibility that it was a stolen vehicle.
Indeed, he apparently had contentedly used the automobile as
his own for years. No other factors existed which would have
otherwise justified a warrantless search. However, we are
bound by Class to conclude that the search was valid.5 The
record indicates that the intrusion was minimal. Officers only
opened the door and recorded the VIN, They did not search the
interior of the car. The inspection was much less intrusive
than that allowed in Class, which involved entry into the car.
Although ordinarily the mere existence of probable cause would
not justify a warrantless search, Class finds that the
existence of probable cause coupled with a nonintrusive
4, The Supreme Court in Class stated that the doorplate VIN as
well as the dashboard VIN is -ordinarily in plain view of
someone outside the automobile.- 106 S. Ct. at 968. This is of
course true only if the door is sufficiently ajar to permit the
doorplate to be viewed. It seems clear that the Supreme Court
would find no distinction of constitutional significance in
moving obstructions so a dashboard VIN could be seen and moving
the car door so a doorplate VIN could be seen. Indeed, if
anything, the latter is less intrusive as the plane defining the
interior of the car is not crossed and the interior, therefore,
not physically penetrated. Nor must the officer make an
election as to which VIN source he will view. In Class, as
here, the officer -checked both those locations, and only those
locations.- Id at 968.
5. It is perhaps true, as the dissent suggests, that the same
result would be reached if the instant case were analyzed under
the standards articulated in California v. Carnev, 105 S. Ct.
2066 (1985). However, because this case is factually closer to
Class and because Class is more narrowly drawn and thus presents
a less drastic departure from previously decided fourth
amendment cases, we are more comfortable premising our decision
on Class.
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examination of a VIN legalizes such examination.6 Therefore,
we hold that the search was legal and that denial of defendant's
motion to suppress was proper.'
II.
JUROR MISCONDUCT
Defendant contends that mistrial should have been declared
when it was discovered that a juror had a conversation with a
witness during the trial. The record indicates that after jury
selection and just prior to the commencement of trial, a juror
and Mr. Hailes, a prosecution witness, had a brief, casual
conversation. Mr. Hailes told the juror he planned to go to
Eureka, Utah and hoped the trial would not last too long. He
also said he was surprised that none of the jurors had indicated,
when asked, that they felt police officers were more believable
than other people. Mr. Hailes told the juror he probably would
have responded affirmatively to that question. When questioned
in chambers by the trial court judge about the conversation, the
juror declared that the conversation had not produced any bias
and that she could fairly assess the evidence without regard to
the conversation. The judge denied defendant's motion for a
mistrial.
6. Justice Brennan's dissent in Class focuses on a perceived
lack of probable cause to search for the VIN. The record here
has no comparable lack. The officers knew-, prior to their
second visit to the subject car, that the VIN on the state's
registration records for the vehicle belonged to a 1973 Mustang
registered in the name of Neil Hailes, not defendant.
Additionally, the vehicle had distinctive markings identical to
those of the stolen vehicle.
7. The Utah Supreme Court has, to date, decided search and
seizure cases argued under a Utah constitutional theory
consonant with decisions under the United States Constitution's
fourth amendment, eschewing a different standard. See State v.
Hvoh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334
(Utah 1984). We agree with the dissent that any departure from
this approach should be announced by our state's supreme court,
not this Court. We further agree that it is in the context of
vehicular searches, which the federal courts have treated with
inconsistency, or worse, where consideration of some departure
from the course set by the federal courts in interpreting the
federal constitution would be most appropriate. We do not agree
that adherence to federal doctrines in this case works a result
so egregious as to make this case the one where plenary
consideration is given to whether our state's constitution
requires something more, or different, than the fourth amendment
to the federal constitution.
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The problem of juror/witness contact was examined in an
early Utah case in which a prosecuting witness had driven a
juror to and from the court throughout the two week trial.
State v, Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, 942 (1925).
Affidavits of both stated they had not discussed the trial and
that the juror had not been influenced in any way. The Utah
Supreme Court noted that the Utah Constitution, art. I, § 12,
guarantees trial by an impartial jury. The witness in Anderson
was one whose testimony was critical to the prosecution. The
Court remanded for a new trial, stating that
any conduct or relationship between a
juror and a party to an action during
trial that would or might, consciously or
unconsciously, tend to influence the
judgment of the juror authorizes and
requires the granting of a new trial,
unless it is made to appear affirmatively
that the judgment of the juror was in no
way affected by such relationship or that
the parties by their conduct waived their
right to make objection to such conduct.
m

at 943.

In State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1977), three jurors
had coffee in a sheriff's office on two occasions when officers
who were witnesses in the case were present. Both the jurors
and the officers testified that there had"been no conversation
about anything pertaining to the case. The Utah Supreme Court
stated that they strongly disapproved of the conduct, as even
the appearance of misconduct should be avoided. The Court
nevertheless held that "notwithstanding a showing of minor
impropriety or irregularity there should be no reversal of a
conviction unless it appears that a party has been prejudiced
in that in the absence of such impropriety there is a
reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been
different.- id. at 1109. The Court found that the trial court
had thoroughly examined the incidents and determined that no
prejudice against defendant resulted. That determination was
given deference and affirmed by the Court.
A different conclusion was reached in State v. Pike, 712
P.2d 277 (Utah 1985). There the Court found that a mistrial
should have been granted where a juror talked to a witjiess.
The Pike Court explained that *[a]nything more than the most
incidental contact during the trial between witnesses and
jurors casts doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at
best gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality."
]&.
at 279-80. The Court stated that Utah has adopted a stringent
rule that -prejudice may well exist even though it is not
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provable and even though a person who has been tainted may not,
himself, be able to recognize that fact," I£. at 280. The
Court stated that in Utah the rule is that any improper contact
between a juror and a witness creates a rebuttable presumption
of prejudice. This presumption arises after any contact "which
goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact."
XfiL. at 280. In applying the presumption, the Court found that,
even though there was no conversation about the trial between
the witness, who was the arresting officer, and the juror, the
effect of the contact was "breeding a sense of familiarity"
which could affect the credibility of that witness with that
juror. The Court held the juror's denial of prejudice or
influence was, therefore, insufficient to overcome the
presumption, and the mistrial should have been granted.
In the present case, the witness, Mr. Hailes, who talked to
the juror, was admittedly a minor witness whose testimony was
uncontroverted. He testified that he had owned a Ford Mustang
with the same VIN as was on the dashboard of the subject
Mustang, and that his Mustang had been destroyed in an
accident. The critical issue, therefore, appears to be the
content of the conversation, which involved the credibility of
police officers as compared with others. Based on Pike, we
must examine whether or not the state successfully rebutted the
presumption of prejudice created by the contact. The state
argues that the presumption was successfully rebutted for three
reasons: (1) the juror stated she was not influenced by the
contact; (2) Mr. Hailes was not a key witness nor in such a
respected position that he would likely be influential; and
most importantly, (3) the testimony presented at trial by
police officers was uncontroverted, so that their credibility
was not an issue.8 The trial judge listened to the testimony
and arguments regarding possible prejudice. We find that he
reasonably determined that the state had sustained its burden
of demonstrating that no prejudice against defendant resulted
from the contact.
8. Police officers offered testimony and evidence to establish
that the car was stolen. Defendant did not dispute that the car
was stolen and the jury was not asked to decide that issue.
Defendant denied he was the person who stole the car. The
question to be decided by the jury, therefore, was whether or
not defendant had stolen the car, which issue did not hinge on
the credibility of the police officers* testimony.
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III.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly
allowed the jury to convict him of both theft of an operable
motor vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle because the
possession charge is a lesser included offense of the theft
charge. Theft of an operable motor vehicle is a second degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) and possession of
a stolen vehicle is a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-1-112 (1982). Defendant contends that under § 76-1-402
(1978) he should not have been convicted of both offenses.
That section states:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense.
An offense is so included when:
(a) it is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission
of the offense charged;
Defendant was charged with theft which occurred in 1981,
and possession of a stolen vehicle occurring in 1985. A
"single criminal episode" is defined as "all conduct which is
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-401 (1978). Because of the remoteness in time of the
two offenses, section 76-1-402 (3) cannot bar the multiple
convictions, as that section is limited to and defined by
"separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode."
Defendant also argues that the offenses should have been
alternative pursuant to the reasoning advanced in State v.
Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983). In Hill, the Utah Supreme Court
considered whether or not defendant should have been convicted
of both aggravated robbery and theft. The court stated that
"the greater-lesser relationship must be determined by
comparing the statutory elements of the two crimes as a
theoretical matter and, where necessary, by reference to the
facts proved at trial." I£. at 97. If it appears that the
greater crime could not have been committed without necessarily
committing the lesser there can be only one conviction".
If the facts were that the possession charge arose from
possession of stolen goods immediately after or close in time
to the theft of those same goods, we might be persuaded by
defendant's arguments and the applicability of Hill. However,

860172-CA

12

where the events occurred four years apart and where there were
intervening circumstances and perhaps intervening possessors of
the stolen goods, the argument fails. The crime of theft by no
means includes retention and possession of the stolen goods for a
period in excess of four years. Therefore, we find,that it was
proper to allow the jury to convict defendant on both charges.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

ORME, Judge: (Concurring)
I concur fully in the main opinion. I write separately to
expand upon why, in my judgment, the juror-witness contact in this
case does not require reversal. JAs I read State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), two
preliminary and two more substantive inquiries are relevant in
considering whether the presumption of prejudice has been rebutted.
Preliminarily, the questioning of the juror and/or witness must be
exhaustive and "disclose the entire contents of the conversation."
Id. at 280. In addition, a complete transcript must be made and
provided on appeal. Id.. These preliminary requirements were both
met in this case. The trial court's examination was thorough and
penetrating, eventually eliciting, as the dissent points out,
disclosure of the comments about police officer credibility.
Moreover, both the prosecutor and defense counsel asked further
questions of the juror. The complete examination was transcribed and
is part of the record before us.
The more substantive inquiries are 1) whether the witness is
an important prosecution witness,- and 2) -the scope and subject
matter of the conversation.- See id. Moreover, there is interplay
between these two inquiries: The more important the witness, the
less relevant the subjects discussed by the witness and juror. Thus,
in Pike, the subject discussed, namely a backyard slip-and-fall
sustained off-duty, was itself quite harmless. Nonetheless, because
of the importance of the witness, as -both the arresting officer and
a witness at the scene of the altercation,- ill., Pike's conviction
M

1. In so stating, I acknowledge the question is a close one.
I also note my agreement with the dissent that the preferred
course in this case would have been to excuse the juror and
seat one of the available alternates. In this area, trial
courts should err on the side of caution to avoid even the
least doubt about the jury's impartiality. All such problems
are avoided, as the dissent observes, if jurors are rigorously
segregated from witnesses.
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was reversed. Although the backyard slip-and-fall was
unrelated to the proceedings, the discussion "had the effect of
breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the
juror's judgment as to credibility." !£. at 281.
In the instant case, the witness Hailes was quite
unimportant. As explained in the main opinion, his limited
testimony was confined to mundane and undisputed matters.
Accordingly, his credibility was wholly inconsequential.
Whether a juror had "a sense of familiarity" with Hailes or
considered him a very scoundrel, he was not a pivotal witness
and the verdict would clearly be the same, regardless of his
preceived credibility. Stated another way, his testimony was
inherently credible and was not challenged or controverted by
defendant, making Hailes a minor, rather than an important,
witness.
Even where, as here, the witness is so unimportant that
the impact of increased familiarity on his credibility is
inconsequential, attention must be given to the "scope and
subject matter of the conversation" between juror and witness.
Id. at 280. Of key concern in this case is Mr. Hailes' remark
about the believability of police officers. While it is likely
the unsolicited comment was dismissed out of hand by the juror,
consistent with the strict approach of Pike we need to assume,
for purposes of analysis, that the comment prompted reflection
by the juror on the veracity of police officers and the
conclusion that perhaps police officers were, after all, more
believable than witnesses generally. As the dissenting opinion
observes, "police officers are generally the most important
witnesses for the prosecution," and in the typical criminal
case an observation such as the one made by Hailes, however
gratuitous and innocently intended, would render the
presumption of prejudice all but impossible to rebut.
Here, however, the officers were no more important as
witnesses than Hailes. Unlike the officer in Pike, who not
only effected Pike's arrest, but also was a key witness to the
events which led to his discharging a shotgun at a car driven
by rowdies, the police witnesses in this case, as explained in
note 8 to the main opinion, testified to matters not in
dispute. Their testimony, if believed, established that the
car found at defendant's home was stolen. However, whether or
to what extent they were believed was of no moment, since
defendant conceded the car was stolen, albeit not by him.
Testimony tying defendant to the original theft was offered
exclusively by witness Luce, and it was the credibility of
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Luce, not the police officers, which mattered.2 This is best
emphasized by defendant's closing argument, which was devoted
to a lengthy discussion of perceived problems with Luce's
identification of defendant as the person who drove off with
the Mustang, while omitting any reference to the police
officers' testimony.
As I see it, the state has demonstrated that Hailes was
not an important witness and that, in the peculiar context of
this case, the subjects discussed by the juror^ and witness
were inconsequential. These factors, when coupled with the
juror's unqualified expression that she had not been influenced
by the conversation with Hailes, serve to rebut the presumption
of prejudice which arises under Pike.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
BILLINGS, Judge: (Concurring in part and dissenting in part)
I agree with Part III of the majority opinion and the
decision reached by the majority that defendant had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the search of the Mustang
and therefore join in Part 1A of the court's opinion. Although
I concur in the result reached by the majority that there was
no unconstitutional search, I disagree with important parts of
the analysis. I further respectfully dissent from Part II of
the majority opinion where my colleagues find that a juror's
conversation with a prosecution witness on the merits of the
proceeding was not grounds for a mistrial. I believe the juror
misconduct denied the defendant a fair trial and would
therefore reverse.
JUROR MISCONDUCT
I am persuaded that the trial judge should have
substituted an alternative juror or declared a mistrial as a
result of a prosecution witness' substantial conversation with
2. By contrast, had Hailes commented about the high degree of
believability of used car salesmen, I would go the other way.
Mr. Luce was an important witness and his credibility, memory,
and identification were material.
3. I do not share the dissent's concern about possible taint
of a second juror. It is clear from the record that the second
juror walked away as Mr. Hailes sat down to "share an ashtray"
with the one juror with whom he then struck up conversation.
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a juror on the merits of the case. I agree with the majority
that our analysis of whether this unauthorized contact denied
the defendant a fair trial is controlled by the recent Utah
Supreme Court case of State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277 (Utah
1985). However, we read Pike differently. In Pikal the
defendant's conviction was reversed when a prosecution witness,
in response to a juror's question as to why he was limping,
simply stated: "I told him I had bunged my toe and he asked me
how I did that and I told him about slipping in my backyard on
the water and breaking [it]." III. at 279. In finding that
this encounter prejudiced the defendant's right to a trial by
an impartial jury and required reversal, the supreme court
stated:
We have long taken a strict approach in
assuring that the constitutional guarantee of
a fair trial not be compromised by improper
contacts between jurors and witnesses,
attorneys, or court personnel.

Anything more then the most incidental contact
during the trial between witnesses and jurors
casts doubt upon the impartiality of the jury
and at best gives the appearance of the
absence of impartiality.

[P]rejudice may well exist even though it is
not provable and even though a person who has
been tainted may not, himself, be able to
recognize that fact.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that improper
juror contact with witnesses or parties raises
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.
Id. at 279-80 (citations omitted).
The court gives two reasons for this strict standard.
First, it is extremely difficult for an appellant to prove how
and to what degree a juror has in fact been influenced by a
contact with a witness. Such influence may subconsciously
affect the juror's judgment as to credibility and therefore the
mere statement from the juror that the contact did not affect
his decision does not suffice to rebut the presumption of
prejudice. Second, the judicial process suffers from the
appearance of impropriety resulting from a juror's conversation
with a witness. Participants and observers are left to wonder
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whether the defendant really received a fair trial. For these
reasons, the court concludes that prejudice must be presumed
whenever a contact goes beyond a mere incidental/ unintended
and brief encounter. l£l. at 280.
The court's strong language in Pike requires close
scrutiny and clear assurance that the presumption of prejudice
is overcome if the contact is substantial: "Indeed/ even if
the jurors had denied that they were influenced by the
encounter in the post trial hearing/ it is not enough to rebut
the presumption of prejudice." !£. at 281.
Pike further instructs that the presumption of prejudice
attaches regardless of what was actually said between the juror
and the witness. See id. at 279. The conversation in Pike was
brief and did not involve the merits of the case and yet the
court found that the presumption of prejudice required reversal.
The facts before this court are more egregious than
those in Pike. In this case the exchange was lengthier/
involved a prosecution witness/ and went to the merits of the
proceedings. When questioned by the trial court the juror
described his conversation with Mr. HaileS/ the prosecution
witness:
Well/ first of all/ he pulled the light switch
in the hall and mentioned that it worked/ and
then he did the other switch. And then he was
saying he hoped it didn't — the case didn't
go long, that he was going to Eureka/ just
driving down there/ where I lived.
Later/ the juror also recalls that Mr. Hailes asked her if she
had served on a jury before. Like the conversation in Pike
this encounter "no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of
familiarity that could clearly affect the juror's judgment as
to credibility". I£. at 281.
The trial judge's questioning of the juror supports the
supreme court's concern in Pike that jurors might not know when
they have been prejudiced and would be hesitant to admit the
taint. When first asked whether there was any conversation
about the case the juror states "no nothing." Further along in
the examination/ the juror continues to insist "the case wasn't
mentioned at all." Finally/ just as the exchange with the
judge is about to terminate/ the juror volunteers:
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He did mention one thing. That he was
surprised at the questions that were asked.
And that he was surprised because he, himself,
would have said yes when you (judge) asked if
we would believe a policeman more than any
other person. That was the only comment that
was made . . . . When the judge asked if we
would believe a policemen more than any other
person, and he said he probably would have
raised his hand.
The majority agrees that the above-described encounter
was more than a "brief incidental contact- which would raise
the presumption of prejudice.
The majority, in a conclusory statement, finds that
*[t]he trial judge listened to the testimony and arguments
regarding possible prejudice. We find that he reasonably
determined that the state had sustained its burden of
demonstrating that no prejudice against defendant resulted from
the contact•" Perhaps the majority adopts the state's
arguments that (1) the juror stated she was not influenced by
the contact; (2) Mr. Hailes was not a key witness; and (3) the
testimony presented at trial by the police officers was
uncontroverted and therefore their credibility was not an
issue. I believe each argument fails.
First, under Pike a mere denial of prejudice by the
juror is insufficient to rebut the presumption, particularly
when, as here, the juror has difficulty admitting the extent of
her conversation.
Second, Mr. Hailes was not a minor, unimportant
witness. Mr. Hailes* testimony was an essential part of the
circumstantial web of evidence which persuaded the jury that
the defendant stole the Mustang. He testified that the VIN
glued to the defendant's dashboard and seized by the police
came from a Mustang which belonged to him and which he had
demolished on Christmas Eve 1975. Mr. Hailes6 testimony
established the sequence of when and how the VIN was available
to the defendant* The testimony supported the state's theory
that the defendant removed the VIN from the wrecked Mustang to
cover up his possession of the stolen Mustang.
Third, and most crucial in my decision that the^
presumption of prejudice was not rebutted in this case," is the
subject matter of the juror-witness exchange. Mr. Hailes'
comment on the credibility of the two police officers who
testified at trial goes to the core of this criminal case. The
majority infers that because no one directly controverted the
officers' testimony they were not important witnesses and
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therefore their credibility was not at issue. I cannot agree.
These two police officers initiated the investigation of the
defendant/ gathered the evidence which was presented to
ultimately convict the defendant, and testified about their
efforts for the prosecution at trial. It is only common sense,
and I believe all jurors understand, that police witnesses are
testifying for the state and against the criminal defendant.
In fact police officers are generally the most important
witnesses for the prosecution. I believe the comment on the
credibility of police witnesses went to the heart of this
circumstantial case against the defendant.
Furthermore, the record is unclear whether there was
another juror who overheard Mr. Hailes* comments. This other
juror was not called and questioned by the trial judge. Again,
as in Pike, we do not have a complete picture of the contacts
below.
Pike inferentially directs trial judges to segregate
jurors from witnesses, parties, and attorneys. In fact the
trial judge in this proceeding after this initial problem
states that he will isolate his jurors. Furthermore, this
incident occurred and was called to the attention of the court
before the trial began. The court, with little difficulty,
could have replaced both tainted jurors with alternates.
In conclusion, I find that the encounter between Mr.
Hailes and the questioned juror created a presumption of
prejudice. Because the contact went to the substance of the
proceedings, and the record does not persuade me the
presumption of prejudice was rebutted, I would reverse for a
new trial by an impartial jury.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEARCH
The defendant challenges the constitutionality of the
search of the Mustang and the consequent discovery of the
incriminating VIN under both the United States and Utah
Constitutions.
The majority finds that the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the VIN discovered after opening his
car door, and then concludes there was no search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. I disagree with the
majority's reading of New York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960 (1986)
(5-4 decision), which they conclude compels this conclusion.
A brief repetition of the facts relevant to the search
in this case is important to demonstrate that Class does not
require the majority's holding. In 1973, a new Ford Mustang
was taken from a dealer for a test drive and never returned.
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Four years later, the salesman involved recognized the
defendant and believed he was the man who had stolen the
Mustang from the salesman's previous employer, Mr. Padilla.
The salesman relayed the information to Mr. Padilla who located
the defendant's place of residence.
Mr. Padilla found a 1973 Ford Mustang parked near the
defendant's residence matching the unique characteristics of
the stolen vehicle including: distinctive arm rests, tie downs
on the hood, a black racing stripe on the hood and sides of the
car, and a scoop on the front of the car. Mr. Padilla wrote
down the license number of the car and notified the police. In
response, Detective Robison went to defendant's neighborhood
and saw the 1973 Mustang with the same license number and the
aforementioned unique characteristics parked on the street.
Robison continued her investigation by running the plate number
and receiving the registered VIN. Six days later Detective
Robison, accompanied by others, returned to the defendant's
neighborhood and again found the unique Mustang parked on the
street. It is undisputed that defendant had no knowledge that
he or his car was under investigation.
The officers peered through the windshield and read the
VIN mounted on the dashboard. There was no visible evidence of
tampering or anything suspicious about the placement or
condition of the dashboard VIN. The VIN did not match the
vehicle stolen from Mr. Padilla's lot. Nevertheless, the
officers opened the car door and observed the VIN on the inside
edge of the door. This VIN matched that af the stolen
Mustang. The officers then arrested the defendant.
Class does not compel the majority's conclusion that the
defendant under the circumstances of this case had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the second VIN located
inside his car. In Class, two police officers observed the
defendant driving in excess of the speed limit with a cracked
windshield in violation of New York law. Class was pulled over
by the police. After the stop, and after Class' exit from the
vehicle, and because the officers could not read the dashboard
VIN from the outside because of a cracked windshield and
covering papers, one officer reached into Class' vehicle to
remove papers on the dashboard in order to read the dashboard
VIN. While moving the papers, the officer observed a gun
protruding from under the driver's seat.
Class does not clearly articulate when one has A
reasonable expectation of privacy in a VIN located inside his
automobile because the focus of the alleged unconstitutional
search in Class is the gun. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Class persuades me that defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN located inside his
car after the officers had read the VIN on his dashboard from
outside the car and found nothing out of the ordinary which
would justify a further search.
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Justice O'Connor carefully limits her holding in Class in
order to write for a splintered Court:
[W]e must decide whether, in order to observe a
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally visible
from outside an automobile, a police officer may reach
into the passenger compartment of a vehicle to move
papers obscuring the VIN after its driver has been
stopped for a traffic violation and has exited the
car. We hold that, in these circumstances, the police
officer's action does not violate the Fourth Amendment*
Id. at 962-63 (emphasis added).
The Court emphasizes that under 49 C.F.R. § 571.115 (1984)
a VIN must be located on the dashboard visible from the
exterior of the vehicle and thus concludes that it is
unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in an object
required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain
view from the exterior of the automobile. Xd. at 966.
Although the Supreme Court uses the term VIN loosely, I do
not believe the Court intended that an officer may open the
door to a vehicle after he has already read and recorded a VIN
visible from the exterior of the car without triggering fourth
amendment protections. As the Court states: "a car's interior
as a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment
protection from unreasonable intrusions from the police. We
agree that the intrusion into that space constituted a
•search.'- I&. at 966. The Court continues:
We note that our holding today does not authorize
police officers to enter a vehicle to obtain a
dashboard-mounted VIN when the VIN is visible from
outside the automobile. If the VIN is in the plain
view of someone outside the vehicle, there is no
justification for governmental intrusion into the
passenger compartment to see it.
111. at 969 (emphasis added).
The police, in opening the door to the 1973 Ford Mustang,
conducted a search subject to fourth amendment protection
because the VIN on the dashboard was clearly visible and did
not appear abnormal upon inspection. This is not an
unimportant technicality in analysis. Under the majority's
view, police may at random and without probable cause search
cars under the pretext of finding another VIN as there would be
no search subject to fourth amendment protection.
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If, as the majority infers, the fourth amendment still
prohibited all warrantless searches of vehicles except upon a
finding of (1) probable cause for the search; and (2) exigent
circumstances, I would find the opening of the Mustang's door
and the discovery of the incriminating VIN an unconstitutional
search. However, I believe that under California v. Carney,
105 SoCt. 2066 (1985), and its progeny, the "automobile
exception" to the search warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment has been expanded to encompass this case. Under
Carnev, anything on wheels can be subjected to a search without
a search warrant, provided the officers have probable cause for
the search. Exigent circumstances are now presumed because of
the vechicle's potential mobility.
In Carney, the majority concluded:
In short, the pervasive schemes of
regulation, which necessarily lead to
reduced expectations of privacy, and the
exigencies attendant to ready mobility
justify searches without prior recourse to
the authority of a magistrate so long as
the overriding standard of probable cause
is met.
I£. at 2070.1
In the instant case, the police officers had probable cause
to suspect that the Mustang searched was stolen. Detective
Robison received a call from the owner of the Mustang who
explained that a former salesman had identified the defendant
as the person who had failed to return a car after an
1. Cases subsequent to Carney have interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision broadly. Most imply that the -automobile
exception- to the fourth amendment allows for warrantless
searches of automobiles if the search is reasonable in scope
and supported by probable cause. There is no longer a need to
demonstrate exigent circumstances as they are presumed from the
wheels on the vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Grandstaff,
807 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hamilton,
792 F.2d 837, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hepperle, 810 F.2d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 1987) (rejected
appellant's argument that no exigent circumstances existed
because the automobile was in disrepair and was incapable of
being moved finding that probable cause is all that is
necessary to justify a warrantless search); State v. Badaett,
200 Conn. 412, 512 A.2d 160, 169 (1986); State v. Cain, 400
N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 1987); State v. Akers, 723 S.W.2d 9, 13
(Mo. App. 1986).
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unaccompanied test drive. Mr. Padilla, the owner, located the
unique Mustang near the defendant's home. Detective Robison
confirmed that the Mustang was registered in the defendant's
name. About a week later, the officers returned to the
neighborhood where the Mustang was parked. It matched the
owner's description of the stolen car. It had distinctive arm
rests, tie downs on the hood, a black racing stripe on the hood
and sides of the car, and a scoop on the front of the car.
Although the majority agrees there was no reason why the
officers should not have gotten a search warrant and no
traditional exigent circumstances, this is no longer fatal to
the search. Under the standard established by the United
States Supreme Court in Carney, the search was reasonable under
the fourth amendment as there was probable cause to believe the
car was stolen.
To date the Utah Supreme Court/ in applying article I, §
14 of the Utah Constitution to warrantless vehicle searches,
has followed the interpretation previously given to the fourth
amendment by the United States Supreme Court. See State v.
Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). I must/ therefore,
reluctantly concur in the decision of the majority that the
search was not unconstitutional. However/ I do not believe
that Utah must continue to accept the United States Supreme
Court's constantly changing interpretation of federal search
and seizure law in interpreting its own constitution. This
change in direction, however, must come from the supreme court
of this state.
Because I suggest a re-examination of Utah law in light of
Carnev, a brief history of the "automobile exception" to the
search warrant requirement of the fourth amendment is
appropriate. Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution and the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution use
identical language to protect their citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Historically, these
constitutional mandates have meant that "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions." Coolidae v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 454-55, (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357, (1967)). See State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d
408, 411 <Utah 1984).
The "automobile exception" to the search warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment was first articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, (1925). In Carroll, the Court concluded that
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant/ because the
vehicle will be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction (exigent
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circumstances), and when the officer has probable cause to
believe that the vehicle is involved in criminal activity, no
search warrant is required. I&. at 151-52.
In Coolidae, the Court, while ultimately concluding that
the -automobile exception" was irrelevant to the facts,
implicitly reaffirmed the two-prong test of exigent
circumstances plus probable cause:
The word "automobile" is not a talisman in whose
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and
disappears. And surely there is nothing in this case
to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule of
Carroll v. United States — no alerted criminal bent
on flight/ no fleeting opportunity on an open highway
after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods
or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the
evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special
police detail to guard the immobilized automobile. In
short, by no possible stretch of the imagination can
this be made into a case where "it is not practicable
to secure a warrant . . . ."
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 461-62 (citations omitted).2
As discussed previously, California v. Carney dramatically
expanded the circumstances where warrantless searches of motor
vehicles will be allowed by eliminating the requirement of
exigent circumstances. Because of the recent, radical
restriction of the fourth amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures of automobiles in Carney, it
may well be time for the Utah Supreme Court to reconsider its
position.
Following the previous federal standard, Utah law has
required a finding of both probable cause and traditional
exigent circumstances to justify the search of a vehicle
without a warrant. State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411
(Utah 1984) (Justice Stewart writing for the court determined
2. Justice White in his dissent in Coolidge argued that the
confusing morass of legal technicalities surrounding
warrantless searches of automobiles should be eliminated. He
proposed the adoption of a simple rule — a search of § movable
vehicle without a warrant would be per se reasonable so long as
the police had probable cause for the search. Coolidge, 403
U.S. at 527 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White's views were essentially adopted by the
Supreme Court in the recent case of California v. Carney, 105
S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
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that "[warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action before
a warrant can be obtained. . . . [T]he police must have
probable cause to believe that the automobile contains either
contraband or evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if
not immediately seized.") (emphasis added); State v. Limb, 581
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) ("Only in exigent circumstances will
the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a
sufficient authorization for a search.-); accord State v. Cole
674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983); State v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d
405, 503 P.2d 848, 849-50 (1972).
The Oregon Supreme Court has observed that w[w]hen this
court gives Oregon law an interpretation corresponding to a
federal opinion, our decision remains the Oregon law even when
federal doctrine later changes." State v. Caraher. 293 Or.
741, 653 P.2d 942, 946 (1982). By the same token, the State of
Utah need not change its search and seizure law merely because
the United States Supreme Court has seen fit to change the
corresponding federal law.
In interpreting its own constitution, a state is not
bound by the interpretation given by the United States Supreme
Court to similar language in the federal constitution. See,
e.g., Oreoon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); State v.
Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981). The Utah Supreme Court
has clearly accepted this principle:
Although Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution
incorporates the same general fundamental principles as
are incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause, our
construction and application of Article I, § 24 are not
controlled by the federal courts' construction and
application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case law
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may be
persuasive in applying Article I, § 24, but that law is
not binding so long as we do not reach a result that
violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted).
State courts responding to the confusing and restrictive
new federal interpretations are relying on an analysis of their
own search and seizure provisions to expand constitutional
protection beyond those mandated by the fourth amendment, often
directly avoiding applicable United States Supreme Court
precedent. See, e.g., State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d
942, 947 (1982); State v. Glass. 583 P.2d 872, 876 (Alaska
1978); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 (Haw. 1974); People v.
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Beavers. 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511, 516 (1975), cert,
denied 423 U.S. 878 (1975); O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d
400, 405 (Minn. 1979); State v. Brackman. 178 Mont. 105, 582
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1978); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d
952 (1982); State v. Kock, 302 Or. 29, 725 P.2d 1285, 1287
(1986); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980); State
v. Ooperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976).
Justice Zimmerman recently criticized the federal approach
to warrantless searches: "The federal law regarding
warrantless searches and seizures has become a labyrinth of
rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing
rationalizations and distinctions." Hygh, 711 P.2d at 271-72
(Zimmerman, J., concurring); see also State v. Johnson, 60 Utah
Adv. Rep. 30, 33 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J. concurring).
While it is true that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Carney has simplified the federal approach to the
automobile exception under the fourth amendment, it has done so
at the sacrifice of the rights of the citizens of this nation
to be secure in their effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The warning of Justice Jackson should be heeded:
[Fourth amendment rights] . . . are not mere
second-class rights but belong in the catalog
of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations
of rights, none is so effective in cowering a
population, crushing the spirit of the
individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the
first and most effective weapons in the
arsenal of every arbitrary government.
Brineoar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
Following many of her sister state courts, the Utah Supreme
Court may take this opportunity to simplify Utah's vehicle
search and seizure law without gutting the protection it
provides to the citizens of this state. See State v. Earl, 716
P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986). Warrantless vehicle searches could
be restricted to only those situations where they serve their
original purpose of protecting police officers and preventing
the immediate destruction of evidence. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
264, 272 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).

Judith M. Billings, Judge
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APPENDIX B

UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

The State of Utah,
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Before Judges Greenwood, Billings and Orme.

Pursant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 3(a),
appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.
Dated this 6th day of October, 1987.
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*M". TADOCCO,
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Deferent.

)
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T
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i , art*

ate

of Utah,

Criminal No. CR 85-742
Judge David B. Dee

by and through

tip n^fpndant,

oy and through

Creighcon

C.

his counsel

T - s s i ^r. «•-i i f her^hy stipulate to the following facts for purp..-5,?c - u the npfon^ant's Motion to Suppress:
In Jun* of 19R1, a 1973 Ford Mustang (Vin *3F05HI64.
A(,p

) ^...M>rtd hy William Padilla was stolen from his car lot, Stace

Aut^ c i'«s, 41*7 ?o. State Street, by a nan who took the rar
*->r a * -=«t ^rivp ?nH nr**'i?r returned it. The salesman assist-13
t-..r> rap w=\s o*-« [uc^. Luce nad seer, the man several ti^es
r-*ior to t^o tp.-»- (H-i^e and later cescrioed him to the police as
vr-s^n*- ' pg "^n o^loui^e, the actor.

Wnen the man failed to

c/-:-.s-

stipulation of F?.cts
Case CP S5-7/12
Page 2
return tht* vehicle cr pay -for it, Mr. Padilla reported the
theft tn th^ police.
Nearly four years later, in May of 1985, Dave Luce,
r:w a salesman pnr Valley Ford, recognized the Defendant, who
h.**ri c.>"v* into test drive another Ford Mustang, as the same
men who had

absconded

with

Padilla ! s

car

in

1981.

Luce

obtained information from a fellow.salesman, Patrick Sullivan,
w*o was

essistlrg

the Defendant.

Defendant had

given his

name as Phillir Wilson and his address as 7442 Gardenia Ave.
At th.^t time n^fendant appeared to be on foot, hut 2 or 2
r*tv'?s |?r?L*

LJCP

noticed the Defendant driving a Mustang which

app^ate-* to Hi*- tc be the same vehicle stolen from Padilla's
1c1" in

la81.

Luce called

Padilla

and conveyed to him the

^•~o*-~ i'-f -?rm?t i on, which

Padilla

later passed

on to Linda

r.-v^^n 0 f the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office.
After receiving the call from Luce, Padilla went to
the vicinity of 74^2 Gardenia Ave, and although there was no
such andress, he located his vehicle parked in front of the
residence *t 7242 Gardenia Ave.
o^ly

p

He recognized the car not

ror its genera] appearance, out from a repaired interior

rVv^- f.'?-o] w^ich hi? shop had worked .on back in 1981 prior co
offo»*l-ia the c^r For sale.

Padilla called the police.

He

.Stipulnticn of F=»cts
°age 3
did not see or sp^ak to the Defendant.
After receiving the call, Detective Robison went to
the vicinity

and

located

the

vehicle

parked

n

e?enr'ant,e* re«idencp at 7242 Gardenia Ave.

in

front

of

She noted t*e

license number cf the car, its description, and the address,
a

.nd left

without

farther

r^idence at that tire.

approaching

the

vehicle

or

the

She conducted, further invest i r; a L ~o:i

by running the pl?f; number and receiving back an associated
VIM number { 3F05P10J <*6fl) . *A VIN searcn through the Department
o? Motor Vehicles rpvaaled that the car which was originally
rogi^t^cd unrJ*r such number, a -1973 Mach One Ford Mustang,
v-is purchased pew in 1973 by Neal Hailes of Salt Lake City.
Ti r'^s \ egist^red tn Hailes through 1975.

The next registra-

tion entry for -uch VIN1 number was to tne Defendant in 19^1.
Approximately one week after first seeing the
"ehicle, Detective

Robison

returned

to Defendant's

address

apri 55 =2w the vehicle parked in front of his residence.

Kip

Inger-o^l From tne Division of Motor Vehicles also responded
to the scene.

The police looked through the windshield and

S?V/

=> <?IN number, 3F05H101968, which did not match the VIN of

the

w?hi-ie v:hich had been stolen from Padilla in 1981.

oolicp oopner* the

unlocked

driver's

door and

checked

The
the

5h*rulnti^n o* pa«:t^
C**<* CP

85-712

Page 4
safecy st^rvi^vd sticker located thereon.
the reportedly
tney opened
th^y rUd

There they locatec

stolen car's VIN, 3F05H164088.

th« door to check

no^ hare

the

a warrant, nor

At the tine

identification
had

they

sticker,

contacted

the

Defendant or anyone at his residence to notify hirn of the
car'? infection nv that he was a suspect in an auto theft.
After Finding
inci^o h^9

the VIN

number

of

the

stolen

car

door r>^n°l, the police contacted Defendant at his

L-ac-Mence.

"3 acknowledged, after Miranda, his possession of

t-hp -phif i<*. telling them that he owned it, having purchase
i** f io~ ^'-re^tor C^^ro] et in the summer of 1981.
seuue^ti ' nroHuc^d
0£

?-;p_q?

?n-

arrfc5w.e'4 > ^

He sub-

a title to trie venicle, hearing the date

i vi^

number

of

3F05H10I968.

The

police

^"/-"n^ant ^n tne mstanc charges.

A*ter irpouncMig the vehicle, Kip Ingersoll of tne
Di^i'-i^n *"»F Motor Vehicles also located another VIN numoer on
t w ° car''2 e^ar-e conpirking ic to be Padilla's vehicle (3F05Hlou.
08q).

-puM-e,=>ftPr they checked the VIN tag on the dashboard

(3Tn^uj ii] nr;«» and found that it had been glued on rather than
ri^r'fo'4,

Sjhseg.jent investigation revealed that the vehicle*

rri;::^1,v reai-tered to Neal Hailes with that VIN number had
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bee^ total !<*ri in a car wreck in December of 1975,
Pv^srectfully submitted

this

fa-*

day of

CR2IGHT0N C. HORTON, II
Deputy County Attorney
<

'•'MA ft .&wvd
LISA REMAU
Attorney for

Defendant

Aagas

